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MILLER v. MUSCARELLE

Liability Of Servant To Fellow 'Servant And
Third Parties For Nonfeasance
Miller v. Muscarelle'
Decedent, a construction worker, was killed when a
portable conveyor which he and others were manually
moving up a ramp collapsed. Decedent's administratrix
sued individually, in tort: (1) the foreman who directed
the decedent's labor crew, alleging the negligent ordering
of a dangerous manuever; (2) the project manager, alleging failure to instruct the foreman how to move the conveyor safely and failure to assign safe equipment; (3) the
general superintendent, alleging failure to inform himself
as to the safe use of the conveyor; and (4) the executive
head of the construction corporation, alleging failure to
institute a safety program.2 At the close of plaintiff's case,
the trial court granted defendants' motions for involuntary
dismissal.3 Administratrix appealed, contending that corporate employees or officers can be liable to an employee
injured as a result of their negligent failure to act. The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, rejected the rule which holds an agent liable to the principal's employees 4 for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance,
and said that in a proper case a corporate employee would
be liable for inaction which leads to injury. However, the
Court denied relief in the instant case because the negligent omissions were not within the duty of defendants
since the corporate employer had not expressly or impliedly placed a duty upon defendants. The Court further
stated that the defendants had not voluntarily assumed
such a duty and they were not burdened with such a duty
1 34 N.J. 574, 170 A. 2d 437 (1961).
2 The employer is not a defendant in this action since it discharged its
obligation in accordance with the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation
Act. Liability of another defendant was decided on the ground of whether
or not his acts constituted misfeasance, and consequently its discussion is
not within the scope of this note.
8A motion for involuntary dismissal under the 1953 New Jersey Rule
4:42 - 2(b) is the equivalent of Maryland Rule 552, "Directed Verdict".

' In its opinion the court followed the

RESTATEMENT

[2

RESTATEMENT,

AGENCY (2d ed. 1958) § 359] and made no distinction between liability
to third persons and to other agents employed by the same principal or to
fellow servants. Although many Courts mention these separate classes,
they are not Individually considered herein, since the bases of liability to
each are virtually indistinguishable.
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solely because they had the implied authority to perform
the omitted acts.
The fact that two individuals are employed by the
same employer does not of itself impose a duty on one to
take affirmative steps to provide for the safety of the
other. Therefore, the Court said, the injured employee
must establish that the common employer has placed on
the dilatory employee a duty, which the latter has accepted, and which is related to the safety of the other
employees. In addition, there must be reliance on the
performance of the duty in order to establish liability for
injuries proximately caused by defendant's inaction.' The
Court thus clearly accepted the principle of liability of an
agent to another employee of the principal based upon
nonfeasance when elements of duty of defendant to the
employer, risk of harm from nonperformance, and reliance
by plaintiff upon defendants' performance are present.
In so stating, the Court expressly rejected the established distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance
which holds that fellow-servants or agents are liable to
each other and to third persons for misfeasance but not for
nonfeasance, and based liability not on the contractual
duty of defendant to his principal, but upon an independent
tort duty of the agent to other employees and third parties.
The misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction has been the
cause of much conflict of authority6 and treatment of the
problem has undergone a shift in rationale
from liability
7
based on contract to tort principles.
Earlier cases strictly adhered to liability based upon
contract principles, requiring that the parties be in privity.'
A principal could sue his agent, with whom he was in
privity, for failure to act, since this was a breach of contractual duty. As to third persons, the agent could be
held for misfeasance since he owed a duty to act with
reasonable care, but he was not liable, due to want of
privity, for nonfeasance, or failure to act.
5Supra, n. 1, 451.
1 See E. N. Emery & Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 194 Ia. 926,
189 N.W. 824, 828 (1922).
770 A.L.R. 97 (1922), supplemented in 99 A.L.R. 408 (1935); Note,
Agency - Liability of Agents to Third Parties for Nonfeasance in Performance of Duty to Principal,21 La. L. Rev. 795 (1961) ; Note, Agency Liability of Servants for Nonfeasance, 10 Okla. L. Rev. 171 (1957) ; Note,
Agency - Liability of Agent to Third Parties for Nonfeasance, 6 NOb. L.
Bul. 179 (1927).
8 See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 N. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406
(Exch. 1842), where driver of a coach, injured by failure of defendant
agent to perform his contract with his principal to keep coach in safe
condition was denied relief on basis of lack of privity of contract.

1962]

MILLER V. MUSCARELLE

This view is commonly attributed to Marsh and Astreys
Case9 where Lord Coke argued that an undersheriff was
not liable for wrongful omission to return a summons, that
being nonfeasance for which only the sheriff was answerable to third persons. Although the court acknowledged
that the undersheriff would be liable to third persons for
positive acts of misfeasance and found for plaintiff, the importance of the case in legal history lies in Coke's argument.
In Lane v. Cotton ° defendant Postmaster General was
held not liable for his clerk's loss of exchequer bills from
a posted letter. Holt, C.J. dissented, applying Coke's reasoning in Marsh and Astreys Case," and proposed judgment for plaintiff, since if he could not recover from the
Postmaster General, as the majority held, he would be left
without a remedy, because recovery from the clerk from
whose possession the loss occurred was not possible in a
case of mere nonfeasance. 2 Although the question of nonfeasance was not before the court, subsequent decisions
relied heavily on Holt's statement.
Judge Story, citing "Lord Holt's celebrated judgment
in Lane v. Cotton,' 3 said that an agent is personally liable
to third parties for misfeasance but not for nonfeasance
in the course of his employment, and that liability for nonfeasance is solely to his principal.'4 Many earlier cases,
in accord with this view, made privity a condition precedent to the agent's liability to persons other than the
principal, 5 including several expressly adopting Judge
S1 Leonard 146, 74 Eng. Rep. 135 (K.B. 1609).
1012 Mod. 473, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1663). The annotator, 20 A.L.R.
97, 101-103 (1922) states that the several reports of this case do not
strictly agree as to what the majority judges hold, or as to what Lord
Holt himself held. However, he states that all of the reports give more
prominence to Holt's dissenting opinion than they do to the prevailing
opinion.
u Id., 1467 cites as 1 Leon. 146, 8upra, n. 9, but not by name.
12Supra, n. 10. Holt stated: "[F]or a servant or deputy, [as] . . . such
cannot be charged for neglect, but the principal only shall be charged for
it . . . , but for a misfeasance an action will lie against a servant or
deputy, but not [as] .. .a deputy or servant, but as a wrongdoer."
Is STORY, AGENCY (9th ed. 1839) § 308, p. 381.
14 STORY, OP. cit. supra, n. 14, 377-80; See also Knight v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 73 F. 2d 76 (5th Cir.), 99 A.L.R. 405 (1934).
1 Cramblitt v. Percival-Porter Co., 176 Ia. 733, 158 N.W. 541, 545 (1916)
Williams v. Dean, 134 Ia. 216, 111 N.W. 931, 933 (1907) ; Dean v. Brock,
11 Ind. App. 507, 38 N.E. 829 (1894). Also see Loud v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
262 S.W. 2d 548 (Tex. 1953), with facts similar to the instant case. See
also Knight v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 8upra, n. 14, for a later statement
of this view.
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Story's rule."6 The position requiring privity of contract
has been subject to criticism 17 for failure to find liability
upon independent tort principles, 8 and the majority of
the American jurisdictions 19 and England 2 have abandoned
the distinction.
Several means of granting relief to the injured party
were found. One was to narrow the meaning of the concept of nonfeasance, consequently widening the scope of
the term misfeasance. This was often done where the
court found the agent owed plaintiff a duty to perform
certain acts, the duty being found in the agent's entrance
into performance of his contract with his principal to act
for the protection of others. Thus some courts limited nonfeasance to the omission or failure of an agent to enter
into performance of some distinct duty or undertaking
which he had agreed with his principal to do,21 and said
that nonfeasance did not include failure to perform an
act after entering upon performance of a contractual obligation.22 If an agent agreed to perform acts for another,
and refused or failed to enter upon such performance, it
was nonfeasance; but if he once began the performance of
such acts and in doing so failed or omitted to do certain
acts which he should have done, whereby a third person
was injured, it was not nonfeasance, but misfeasance.2 '
The test of liability based on nonfeasance was whether or
not the agent had assumed to act. This narrowed definition
of nonfeasance did not deny the validity of the misfeasancenonfeasance distinction.
In cases where there was actually nonfeasance, some
courts called it misfeasance in order to grant recovery
"Bryce v. Southern Ry. Co., 125 F. 958, 961-962 (C.C.S.C. 1903) ; Kelly
v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co., 122 F. 286, 290 (C.C. Mo. 1903) ; Wilson v. Thayer
County Agricultural 'Soc., 115 Neb. 579, 213 N.W. 966, 970, 52 A.L.R. 1393

(1927).

17 The instant case states: "The nonfeasance distinction thus resolves
itself into little more than a totally illogical remnant of the privity
dbe trine."
"Osborne v. Morgan, 130 Mass. 102, 39 Am. Rep. 437, 439 (1881).
"2 Am. Jur. 256, Agency, § 325.
'Nolte, Liability of Agents to Third Parties for Nonfeasance in Per.
formance of Duty to Principal,21 La. L. Rev. 795, 798 (1961).
2Cf. Ranson v. Haner, 25 F.R.D. 84, 86 (D. Alaska 1960).
2Southern Ry. Co. v. Grizzle, 124 Ga. 735, 53 S.E. 244, 245 (1906);
E. N. Emery & Co. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 194 Ia. 926, 189
N.W. 824, 828 (1922) ; Osborne v. Morgan, supra, n. 18, 438-439, a leading
case for this position; Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W.
1062, 1067-1068 (1906); Cornett v. Hardy, Tex. Cit. App., 241 S.W. 2d
186, 190 (1951) ; CL.AR & SKYLES, AGENCY (1905) pp. 1299-1300; MEcHEm,
AGENCY (1914) pp. 1088-1089.
3 TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) § 137, pp. 358-359.
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the particuwithout any express rationalization as to how
24
lar conduct could be viewed as misfeasance.
Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester,25 independent
of privity of contract, reached the interesting result of
finding an agent liable to a third party for nonfeasance
based upon "privity in law." The wrong alleged was
failure to keep a passenger elevator in safe condition. The
court said that an agent in charge of property has the duty
to manage it so as not to injure others, who have a right
to use the property, and such duty is independent of any
agency arising out of a contract.
However, others felt the distinction had lost its validity
and expressly rejected it.2 6 These courts based their decisions entirely on tort liability, independent of the contract, and asked whether the servant or agent owed the
injured party a duty to act which had been breached,27
and did not become bogged down in misfeasance-nonfeasance distinctions.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division,
in the instant case, adopted the position of the RESTATEM ENT, 28 which modifies the effect of the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance and determines the
agent's liability on the basis of his duty to plaintiff, considering factors of reliance by plaintiff upon defendant's
performance
and defendant's creation of risk of harm to
29
plaintiff.
21 Consolidated Gas Co. v. Connor, 114 Md. 140, 78 A. 725 (1910);
Brower
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Minn. 385, 124 N.W. 10, 11 (1910); Vaughn
v. Mountain Grove Creamery, Ice & Electric Co., 275 S.W. 592, 595-596
(Mlo. App. 1925) ; McCarver v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 268 S.W. 687, 690 (Mo.
App. 1925) ; Orcutt v. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 99 S.W. 1062, 1068
(1906).
2180 Ind. 357, 101 N.E. 915, 918 (1913).
"Evans Chemical v. Ball, 159 Ky. 399, 167 S.W. 390, 394 (1914);
Haynes' Adm'rs. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co., 145 Ky. 209, 140 S.W.
176, 179 (1911); McOourtie v. Bayton, 159 Wash. 418, 294 P. 238, 240
(1930); Colton v. Foulkes, 259 Wis. 142, 47 N.W. 2d 901, 904 (1951);
Hoeverman v. Feldman, 220 Wis. 557, 265 N.W. 580, 582 (1936).
2Mayer
v. Thompson-Hutchison Bldg. Co., 104 Ala. 611, 16 So. 620, 623624 (1894) ; Murray v. Cowherd, 148 Ky. 591, 147 S.W. 6, 9 (1912) ; Hayes'
Adm'rs. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co., 145 Ky. 209, 140 S.W. 176, 179-180
(1911) ; Darling & Co. v. Fry, 24 S.W. 2d 722, 723-724 (Mo. App. 1930) ;
Hoeverman v. Feldman, 220 Wis. 557, 265 N.W. 580, 582 (1936) ; 38 Am.
Jur. 662, Master & Servant, § 20; 20 A.L.R. 97, 165; 2 RESTATEMENT, AGENOY
(2d ed. 1958) § 352, Comment "A", p. 123; although liability of a servant
of agent was not involved, see Otis Elevator Co. v. Embert, 198 Md. 585,
84 A. 2d 876 (1951) noted 14 Md. L. Rev. 77 (1954).
"2 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (2d ed. 1958) §§ 350, 351, 352, 354, 356, 358, 359.
2However,
the "Caveat" to § 354 states: "If the agent has not entered
upon performance, it is not clear that liability will result from the agent's
subject failure of performance."
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No Maryland cases have been found which are on point.
In Consolidated Gas v. Connor,30 defendant, who had contracted with the city to repair its gas pipes, negligently
sent gas through a defective pipe, injuring plaintiff, a
third party, and was found liable. The Maryland Court
of Appeals treated defendant as an agent of the city and
held that his conduct was misfeasance rather than nonfeasance as contended.
"If... the Gas Company... had failed to supply gas
to the City lamps in accordance with its contract, this
would have been a nonfeasance, for which the company would have been responsible only to the City.
But when, in carrying out the contract, it distributes
the gas through defective pipes and thus permits it to
escape into the streets and houses of the City, there
is manifestly involved an affirmative element of
negligence amounting to misfeasance, and for this the
company is liable
to anyone who may suffer in
31
consequence."'
Thus in determining the liability of an agent or servant
to third parties, the Maryland Court of Appeals maintained the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction, but appeared to narrow the scope of nonfeasance to situations
where there was a failure to enter into performance, i.e.,
total inaction.
However, in cases of tort liability to third parties arising from breach of contract where defendant was not an
agent or servant, the Maryland Court of Appeals has determined liability solely on the basis of tort duty to plaintiff,
even though defendant was under contract to perform
duties to persons other than plaintiff. E. Coast Fr. Lines v.
Cons. Gas Co.,8 2 citing Consolidated Gas Co. v. Connor, in
considering liability of defendant to plaintiff third-party
for not providing electric current according to its contract
with the city,3 3 did not discuss the misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction, but settled the question on the basis of duty of
defendant to plaintiff, and found for defendant due to lack
of existent duty.
Although not directly on point, Otis Elevator Co. v.
Embert34 is illustrative of the Court of Appeals' treat- 114 Md. 140, 78 A. 2d 725 (1910).

31Id., 156-157. Emphasis added.
" 187 Md. 385, 50 A. 2d 1946.
Id., 402.

198 Md. 585, 597-598, 84 A. 2d 876 (1951), noted 14 Md. L. Rev. 77
(1954).
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ment of the now rather esoteric misfeasance-nonfeasance
distinction.
"The absence of tort liability for breach of contract
is not qualified by the distinction between non-feasance
and misfeasance. In such cases such a distinction is
not between non-performance and 'misperformance'
of a contract, but only between conduct, in breach of
a contract, which constitutes only a breach of contract
and conduct which also constitutes a breach of duty,
arising out of the nature of the work undertaken and
the conduct, to third persons. Indeed the distinction
denotes a difference between absence and existence
deterof tort liability, but does not appreciably aid3in
5
mining whether or not such liability exists."
It would appear that if the instant case were to come
before the Maryland Court of Appeals, it would refrain
from making such distinctions and settle the question of
liability of a servant or agent to fellow servants and third
parties solely on the basis of duty owed them by defendant,
thus accepting the majority view.
Historical reliance on the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction appeared to be due to a failure of the courts to
properly recognize the existence of an agent's duty to
third parties independent of his contract of performance
with his principal. The courts were reluctant to relinquish
contract-oriented concepts of privity as a basis of their
determinations. The use of the distinction caused needless
confusion since considerations of duty offered a more useful
approach. Further, as a practical matter, classification of
particular conduct as misfeasance of nonfeasance was difficult. Consequently the decision of the instant case is to be
commended both for placing the important determination
of an agent's liability on sound footing by considering the
question of duty to plaintiff and for avoiding needless
distinctions.
ABEL MEaLL
I1M., 597-598. Emphasis added.

